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Criminal Law
Thomas D. Church*
Kate Forrest**
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article provides a comprehensive review of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit’s most noteworthy criminal
law opinions from 2021. Section II of this Article addresses substantive
criminal offenses, such as economic crimes, drug offenses, and firearm
offenses, while Section III covers criminal procedure and constitutional
issues arising in criminal prosecutions. Section IV deals with the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines (the Guidelines) and other sentencing
issues, and Section V provides a limited review of the court’s decisions
in post-conviction proceedings.1
II. SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSES
A. Drug Offenses
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
published several opinions governing drug offenses in 2021. In United
States v. Colston,2 the court affirmed the defendant’s conviction under
the Controlled Substances Act where, despite the government and
defendant’s agreement to the contrary, the court held that the
government did not have to prove the defendant’s knowledge of the
*Trial Attorney at Pate, Johnson & Church, LLC, Atlanta, Georgia. Emory University
(B.A., 2012); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., 2017). Member, State Bar of
Georgia.
**Trial Attorney at Pate, Johnson & Church, LLC, Atlanta, Georgia. University of Georgia
(B.A., 2012); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., 2017). Member, State Bar of
Georgia. Tom and Kate are the authors of thefederaldocket.com, a law blog dedicated to
highlighting noteworthy federal circuit court opinions and news in federal criminal law.
1. For an analysis of last year’s criminal law and the Guidelines during the prior
survey period, see Thomas D. Church, Criminal Law, Eleventh Circuit Survey, 72
MERCER L. REV. 967 (2021).
2. 4 F.4th 1179 (11th Cir. 2021).
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specific drug she possessed even though the indictment alleged a
specific type and quantity of the drug.3
The Eleventh Circuit also addressed the thorny issue of allowing law
enforcement agents to testify as experts in drug cases, specifically
regarding the use of coded language in intercepted phone calls
discussing drugs. In United States v. Perry,4 the court held that the
agent had been properly qualified to interpret the code words, though
the court cautioned against crossing the line “from interpreting coded
drug language to opining about plain language, speculating,
summarizing the evidence or telling the jury what inferences to draw
from the conversations.”5 The court also held that admission of a
recorded call between the defendant and a non-testifying co-conspirator
did not violate the Confrontation Clause, since the co-conspirator’s
hearsay statements provided context for the defendant’s statements.6
Finally, in the Eleventh Circuit’s split with the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s interpretation7 of the Maritime Drug
Law Enforcement Act8 in United States v. Nunez,9 it held that the
United States had jurisdiction over a boat that had been stopped and
searched by the Coast Guard.10 The court concluded that the boat fell
within the definition of a “vessel without nationality[,]” even though the
occupants had not been specifically asked if they claimed any
nationality, reasoning that the boat flew no flag, carried no documents
or other identifying information, and no one aboard it claimed that the
craft was registered to any nation.11
B. Economic Offenses
The court rendered a series of notable opinions governing fraud
offenses, bribery, and other financial crimes. Regarding wire fraud
offenses, the court issued several important rulings. In United States v.
Wheeler,12 the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the convictions of three
defendants and reversed the United States District Court for the

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id. at 1187–89, 1193.
14 F.4th 1253 (11th Cir. 2021).
Id. at 1262–65.
Id. at 1273–74.
United States v. Prado, 933 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2019).
46 U.S.C. §§ 70501–70508 (2016).
1 F.4th 976 (11th Cir. 2021).
Id. at 980.
Id. at 985–86.
16 F.4th 805 (11th Cir. 2021).
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Southern District of Florida’s judgment of acquittal for two others.13 It
held that there was sufficient evidence that the defendants had an
intent to defraud, as opposed to a mere intent to deceive, in a
telemarketing scheme where they misled investors regarding how much
profit their company made; lied about their company’s association with
high-profile companies and executives; told investors that the company
planned to go public; assured the investors that they were paid in stock
rather than commissions on stock sales; and concealed that there would
be restrictions on selling their stock.14
The Eleventh Circuit also affirmed convictions for wire fraud in
United States v. Estepa,15 holding there was sufficient evidence of a
scheme to defraud where the defendants won contracting bids from
their local government based on material misrepresentations that they
would comply with the “prevailing local wage” requirements, despite
the fact that the government did not suffer a financial loss as a result of
this representation.16 In another important case, the court held that the
government was able to subpoena privileged communications from a
politician’s attorney because the government was able to establish a
“prima facie case of wire fraud” by the candidate at the time he was
soliciting the attorney’s advice and because there was a sufficient nexus
between the communications and the alleged wire fraud scheme.17
The Eleventh Circuit issued two noteworthy opinions regarding
bribery offenses. In one case involving a matter of first impression, the
court held the “official act” requirement from McDonnell v. United
States18 does not apply to “[f]ederal program” bribery, namely bribery
offenses involving federally funded programs.19 In another case, United
States v. Mayweather,20 the court held the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia’s instruction on “official act” in a
Hobbs Act extortion trial, involving corrupt prison guards smuggling
drugs into the prison, was reversible error where the instruction did not
allow the jury to determine whether the officers wearing their uniforms
during their offense amounted to an “official act.”21

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 811.
Id. at 811–12.
998 F.3d 898 (11th Cir. 2021).
Id. at 900–01, 909–10.
In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 2 F.4th 1339, 1346, 1351 (11th Cir. 2021).
579 U.S. 550 (2016).
United States v. Roberson, 998 F.3d 1237, 1247 (11th Cir. 2021).
991 F.3d 1163 (11th Cir. 2021).
Id. at 1168.
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Finally, the Eleventh Circuit addressed healthcare fraud in a pair of
opinions. In United States v. Abovyan,22 it affirmed a physician’s
conviction for conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud based on
circumstantial evidence that (1) he created standing orders resulting in
his facilities ordering unnecessary lab tests three times per week per
patient; (2) he presigned forms that resulted in more unnecessary
testing; (3) he had different standards for uninsured patients; (4) he
provided his login information and presigned prescription pads to
employees who prescribed unnecessary drugs when he was not present;
(5) he took no action after he was warned there were billing issues; and
(6) he deferred medical decisions to the clinic’s owner, who had no
medical training.23
In another case involving healthcare fraud and “pill mill” charges,
the Eleventh Circuit held that a defendant can be found guilty of
healthcare fraud based on the defendant’s knowledge or participation in
the submission of medical claims relating to illegal prescriptions.24 And
while the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Alabama was “unquestionably wrong” in instructing the jury that the
parties had stipulated to a disputed fact that they had not actually
stipulated to, the court held that the stipulation did not amount to a
directed verdict since the stipulation did not establish any element of
the charged offenses or any facts necessary to establish any elements
nor did it rise to a “constitutional violation” since the defendant was
otherwise able to present their theory of defense.25
C. Firearm Offenses
The Eleventh Circuit issued several important opinions regarding
firearm offenses in 2021. In United States v. Harris,26 in a “reverse
sting police corruption case,” the court affirmed the drug and firearm
convictions of two police officers who had served as protection for drug
couriers, holding there was sufficient evidence to convict them for
carrying a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking where the officers
carried their department-issued firearms while accompanying the drug
couriers even though the guns were not visible.27

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

988 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2021).
Id. at 1303.
United States v. Akwuba, 7 F.4th 1304, 1307 (11th Cir. 2021).
Id. at 1313.
7 F.4th 1276 (11th Cir. 2021).
Id. at 1281–82.
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In cases involving possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, the
Eleventh Circuit continued adapting its case law to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Rehaif v. United States.28 In United States v.
Roosevelt Coats,29 the court held that it was plain error for the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia to accept the
defendant’s guilty plea without informing him the government had to
prove that he knew he was a felon but concluded this was not a
“structural error[,]” and the defendant failed to show he would not have
pleaded guilty had he been advised of the government’s burden.30 In
another case, the court upheld an indictment against the defendant’s
challenge that an indictment alleging a violation of Title 18 § 922(g) of
the United States Code31 must also mention Title 18 § 924(a)(2),32 which
sets out the penalties for violating section 922(g).33
The court also addressed sentencing issues in firearm cases. In
United States v. Matthews,34 it held, as a matter of first impression,
that the enhancement under Section 2K2.1(a)(3) of the United States
Sentencing Guidelines35 for an offense involving a “semiautomatic
firearm capable of accepting a large capacity magazine” was warranted
in a case where the defendant attempted to purchase a rifle “which
comes standard with a magazine of 30 rounds.”36 In United States v.
Montenegro,37 the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Florida’s decision to apply a firearms
enhancement under Section 2D1.1(b)(1) of the United States Sentencing
Guidelines38 over the objections of not only the defendant but also the
government, holding that the presence of a bolt-action rifle at the
defendant’s residence, where drug evidence was found, shifted the
burden to the defendant to negate a connection between the rifle and
his drug charge, which he did not do.39

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

139 S.Ct. 2191 (2019).
8 F.4th 1228 (11th Cir. 2021).
Id. at 1235–38.
18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2015).
18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (2018).
United States v. Leonard, 4 F.4th 1134, 1142–43 (11th Cir. 2021).
3 F.4th 1286 (11th Cir. 2021).
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.1(a)(3) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
Matthews, 3 F.4th at 1287–88, 1290–91, 1299.
1 F.4th 940 (11th Cir. 2021).
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(b)(1) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
Montenegro, 1 F.4th at 945, 947–48.
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D. Sex Offenses
The Eleventh Circuit published several notable opinions relating to
cases involving child pornography. In United States v. Phillips,40 for
example, the court affirmed a defendant’s conviction for production of
child pornography, holding that the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Florida did not constructively amend the
indictment when it instructed the jury that it did not have to find that
the defendant knew the victim’s age to convict, since this is not an
element of production under Title 18 § 2251 of the United States Code.41
In United States v. Litzky,42 the court affirmed the defendantmother’s conviction for production of child pornography, holding that
the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida
properly excluded the defendant’s expert testimony that the defendant’s
intellectual disability, coupled with a history of victimization, made her
extremely vulnerable and that she would not have produced the
pornographic content absent the defendant-father’s manipulation.43 The
court held that such testimony would have been irrelevant and was not
trustworthy.44
The Eleventh Circuit also addressed several sentencing issues in
child pornography cases. In United States v. Dominguez,45 the court
considered for the first time whether, as the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has held, “sexual activity” under
Section 2G2.2(b)(5) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines46
requires physical contact.47 The court concluded that “sexual activity”
under the Guidelines and Title 18 § 2422(b) of the United States Code
“does not require actual or attempted physical contact.”48 Regarding the
enhancement under Section 2G2.1(b)(5) of the United States Sentencing
Guidelines,49 which applies when the minor victim is “in the custody,
care, or supervisory control of the defendant,” the court held in United
States v. Isaac50 that the enhancement applied where the defendant
was akin to a “temporary caretaker” with “caretaking responsibilities”
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

4 F.4th 1171 (11th Cir. 2021).
Id. at 1175, 1178; 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2008).
18 F.4th 1296 (11th Cir. 2021).
Id. at 1299, 1304–05.
Id. at 1304.
997 F.3d 1121 (11th Cir. 2021).
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2(b)(5) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
Dominguez, 997 F.3d at 1123.
Id.
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.1(b)(5) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
987 F.3d 980 (11th Cir. 2021).
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for the victim after he agreed to house the victim and her family and
was providing them with “basic living necessities.”51
In United States v. Kushmaul,52 in applying the categorical approach
under the plain error standard of review, the court held that a
defendant’s prior conviction under Fla. Stat. § 827.071(3)53 constituted a
prior conviction of “aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive
sexual conduct involving a minor or ward” sufficient to trigger the
enhanced mandatory minimum sentence under Title 18 § 2252(b)(1) of
the United States Code.54
Finally, the court addressed restitution in child pornography cases,
holding in United States v. Williams55 that the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida was required to award the
victim restitution even after she stated that she did not want it—given
the terms of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act.56
E. Immigration Offenses
The Eleventh Circuit issued two important opinions interpreting
Title 18 § 1546(a) of the United States Code,57 which prohibits the
possession of a forged “document prescribed by statute or regulation for
entry into or as evidence of authorized stay or employment in the
United States.”58 In United States v. Chinchilla59 and United States v.
Maradiaga,60 the defendants were each charged with violations of
section 1546(a) for possessing forged “orders of supervision,” which are
forms issued by United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement
that permit an unlawful alien’s release from custody subject to
conditions pending their removal.61 Affirming the defendant’s conviction
in one case and reversing dismissal of the indictment in the other, the
Eleventh Circuit held that an “order of supervision” is properly within
the class of documents covered by section 1546(a) because the form

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 991–93.
984 F.3d 1359 (11th Cir. 2021).
FLA. STAT. § 827.071(3) (2012).
Kushmaul, 984 F.3d at 1364–67; 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1) (2012).
5 F.4th 1295 (11th Cir. 2021).
Id. at 1304, 1306, 1309.
18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) (2002).
Id.
987 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2021).
987 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir. 2021).
Chinchilla, 987 F.3d at 1305, 1309; Maradiaga, 987 F.3d at 1319.
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provides “evidence of authorized stay in the United States”—even
though such an authorized stay is temporary.62
The court also considered sentencing issues arising in illegal reentry
cases. In United States v. Osorto,63 the court upheld the defendant’s
enhancements for illegal reentry as a previously-convicted felon,
rejecting the defendant’s argument that this guideline violated the
equal protection rights of non-citizens.64 The court agreed that Title 28
§ 994(d) of the United States Code65 prohibits courts from considering a
defendant’s national origin but reasoned that “alienage—not being a
citizen of the United States—differs from national origin, [namely,] the
particular country in which one was born.”66
F. The Armed Career Criminal Act, Terrorism Offenses, and Other
Violent Crimes
The court continued interpreting the proper application and scope of
the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA)67 in 2021. In United States v.
Dudley,68 for example, the court held that a district court considering a
defendant’s prior convictions may rely on the prosecutor’s proffered
factual basis during the defendant’s previous plea proceeding to
determine whether the defendant’s predicate offenses were committed
on different occasions from one another.69 However, the court indicated
there must be some evidence of “confirmation of the factual basis for the
plea by the defendant—be it express or implicit confirmation.”70
The court also held that a prior conviction for aggravated assault
under Georgia law is not a prior conviction for a “violent felony” under
the ACCA,71 while a conviction under Virginia law for possession of
cocaine with intent to distribute was a “serious drug offense” under the
ACCA even though the defendant had merely been “sharing” the drugs
with another.72 As a matter of first impression, the court also held in
United States v. Sharp73 that the government did not waive its
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Chinchilla, 987 F.3d at 1307, 1315; Maradiaga, 987 F.3d at 1321.
995 F.3d 801 (11th Cir. 2021).
Id. at 821–22.
28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (2006).
Osorto, 995 F.3d at 822.
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2018).
5 F.4th 1249 (11th Cir. 2021).
Id. at 1261–63.
Id. at 1262.
United States v. Carter, 7 F.4th 1039, 1041, 1045–46 (11th Cir. 2021).
United States v. Stancil, 4 F.4th 1193, 1197–98 (11th Cir. 2021).
21 F.4th 1282 (11th Cir. 2021).
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argument that the defendant’s prior conviction for terroristic threats
under Georgia law qualified as a predicate offense where “the argument
was foreclosed by binding precedent at the time of sentencing and the
change in law occurred within the time to file a notice of appeal.”74
The court also published important opinions relating to terrorism
and other similar offenses. In United States v. Arcila Ramirez,75 the
court held as a matter of first impression that the government must
prove that a defendant’s offense was planned “to influence or affect the
conduct of government by intimidation or coercion,” even if that was not
the defendant’s “personal motive,” to satisfy the “calculated” prong
under Title 18 § 2332b of the United States Code,76 the statute defining
a “federal crime of terrorism.”77
In United States v. Grady,78 a case involving a group of religious
activists opposed to nuclear weapons who snuck onto a naval
installation, the court affirmed their convictions for destruction of
government property and trespass, rejecting their argument that their
charges should have been dismissed under the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA).79 In another matter of first impression in
United States v. Fleury,80 the court held that the Federal Stalking
Statute81 was not facially overbroad.82 Nor was it unconstitutionally
applied to the defendant’s case, which involved the defendant sending
threatening and intimidating messages to the family and loved ones of
victims killed in the school shooting in Parkland, as these were “true
threats” not related to a matter of public concern.83
G. Computer Crimes
The Eleventh Circuit’s prior decision in United States v. Van Buren84
was reversed by the Supreme Court on June 3, 2021.85 Back before the
Eleventh Circuit, the court adopted the Supreme Court’s holding that a

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 1288.
16 F.4th 844 (11th Cir. 2021).
18 U.S.C. § 2332b (2015).
Arcila Ramirez, 16 F.4th at 848, 854–55.
18 F.4th 1275 (11th Cir. 2021).
Id. at 1280–81.
20 F.4th 1353 (11th Cir. 2021).
18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2)(B) (2020).
Fleury, 20 F.4th at 1363.
Id. at 1366.
940 F.3d 1192 (11th Cir. 2019), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 1648 (2021).
141 S.Ct. 1648 (2021).
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person only violates Title 18 § 1030 of the United States Code,86 the
Computer Fraud Statute, if a person accesses a computer without
authorization or “accesses a computer with authorization but then
obtains information located in particular areas of that computer—such
as files, folders, or databases—that are off limits to him.”87 The court
accepted that section 1030 does not apply to defendants “who, like Van
Buren, have improper motives for obtaining information that is
otherwise available to them.”88
III. FOURTH AMENDMENT ISSUES AND FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A. The Fourth Amendment
The Eleventh Circuit issued several significant opinions dealing with
the Fourth Amendment in 2021. Headlining these cases was United
States v. Watkins,89 where the court, sitting en banc, held that the
government must show by a preponderance of the evidence that
evidence subject to suppression would ultimately have been discovered
anyway to trigger the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary
rule.90
In United States v. Braddy,91 the court upheld a traffic stop where
officers searched the defendant’s car after observing two drug detection
dogs briefly exhibit unusual behavior around the defendant’s vehicle,
even though the dogs did not give a “final response” or alert, and the
defendant had an expert testify that the dogs’ behavior was not reliable
enough to establish probable cause.92 Concurring in part and dissenting
in part, Judge Rosenbaum concluded that the officers’ observations of
the dogs’ behavior were “closer to the kind of ‘inarticulate hunches’ that
the Fourth Amendment forbids.”93
The court upheld another vehicle search in United States v. Isaac,
where officers seized the defendant’s phone, which was later found to
contain child abuse images, from his car during a “routine inventory
search” of his vehicle after it was impounded.94 The court rejected the
defendant’s argument that the phone must be suppressed because the
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2020).
United States v. Van Buren, 5 F.4th 1327, 1327 (11th Cir. 2021).
Id.
10 F.4th 1179 (11th Cir. 2021) (en banc).
Id. at 1181, 1185.
11 F.4th 1298 (11th Cir. 2021).
Id. at 1306, 1312–13.
Id. at 1315 (Rosenbaum, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Isaac, 987 F.3d at 984.
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officers did not give him a chance to have someone retrieve his vehicle
as an alternative to impoundment, contrary to their department’s
policy, holding that the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida did not clearly err in crediting the officer’s testimony
that the “alternatives to impoundment” were impractical.95
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit provided a reminder of the power of the
good faith exception under United States v. Leon,96 holding in United
States v. Morales97 that, even assuming the magistrate judge erred in
issuing a search warrant based on officers finding small amounts of
marijuana during two close-in-time trash pulls, the officers reasonably
relied on the warrant, rendering suppression unwarranted.98
B. Criminal Procedure
In cases dealing with procedural issues, the Eleventh Circuit issued
two noteworthy opinions relating to juror disqualification. After
rehearing the case en banc in United States v. Brown,99 the court
vacated a defendant’s convictions and remanded for a new trial after
the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida
dismissed a juror for stating, shortly after the start of deliberations,
that the Holy Spirit had told him the defendant was not guilty.100 The
court reasoned that this statement did not categorically disqualify the
juror since jurors may consult their religious beliefs so long as they do
not contradict the law, and the record here otherwise established a
substantial possibility that the juror was rendering proper jury
service.101
In United States v. Pendergrass,102 the court affirmed the defendant’s
conviction, finding no error in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia’s refusal to excuse a juror for cause based
on her employment as a Georgia probation officer, though Title 28
§ 1863(b)(6) of the United States Code103 bars members of the “police
departments of any State” or subdivision thereof from jury service.104
Though Georgia law gives probation officers arrest powers and requires
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 989–90.
468 U.S. 897 (1984).
987 F.3d 966 (11th Cir. 2021).
Id. at 972, 974–76.
996 F.3d 1171 (11th Cir. 2021).
Id. at 1175.
Id. at 1194.
995 F.3d 858 (11th Cir. 2021).
28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(6) (1992).
Pendergrass, 995 F.3d at 871.
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them to be Georgia Peace Officer Standards and Training Council
(POST) certified, the court concluded probation officers are nevertheless
not “members of . . . police departments” under the plain language of
the statute.105
The Eleventh Circuit also issued a significant opinion regarding the
defense of entrapment. In Mayweather, the court held the defendants
were entitled to jury instructions on entrapment where they met the
“light” standard of proving government inducement.106 In that case,
undercover government agents persuaded prison guards to help
smuggle drugs into prisons by promising them more money, minimizing
their chances of getting caught, and doing so despite some hesitation by
the defendant.107 Conversely, in United States v. Cannon,108 the court
held the government’s actions did not amount to entrapment or
“outrageous government conduct” where the government presented the
defendants with an “opportunity to rob a stash house,” but the
defendants were involved in planning and executing the robbery.109
IV. FEDERAL SENTENCING
The Eleventh Circuit decided several noteworthy cases involving the
proper application of the Guidelines and other important sentencing
issues. Of particular note for federal practitioners, the court published
two opinions regarding the “safety valve” under Title 18 § 3553(a) of the
United States Code,110 which allows courts to sentence qualifying
defendants under the mandatory minimum in drug cases and which
was recently expanded under the First Step Act of 2018.111
In United States v. Garcon,112 the court considered the proper
interpretation of the expanded safety valve under Title 18 § 3553(f) of
the United States Code,113 which states that defendants may qualify for
the safety valve if, among other criteria, they do not have “(A) more
than 4 criminal history points, excluding any criminal history points
resulting from a 1-point offense, as determined under the sentencing
guidelines; (B) a prior 3-point offense, as determined under the
sentencing guidelines; and (C) a prior 2-point violent offense, as
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 871–72.
Mayweather, 991 F.3d at 1177–79.
Id. at 1168–69.
987 F.3d 924 (11th Cir. 2021).
Id. at 942.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2018).
Id.
997 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2021).
18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (2018).
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determined under the sentencing guidelines[,]” concluding that these
provisions must be read disjunctively despite the use of the word
“and.”114 Otherwise, as the government noted, this provision would bar
very few defendants.115 The decision would have created a circuit split
based on the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s
contrary holding in United States v. Lopez,116 but the Eleventh Circuit
subsequently vacated the opinion and agreed to consider the issue
sitting en banc.117
Regarding the safety valve under the Guidelines, the court reiterated
in United States v. Carrasquillo118 that there are different standards for
applying the gun enhancement under section 2D1.1(b)(1) and the safety
valve under section 5C1.2, as “not all defendants who receive the
firearm enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(1) are precluded from relief
under § 5C1.2(a)(2).”119 While the gun enhancement may be applied
based on the presence of a firearm, which shifts the burden to the
defendant to prove it is “clearly improbable” that the firearm was
connected to the offense, the safety valve provision applies if the
defendant shows it is “more likely than not that the possession of the
firearm was not in connection with the offense.”120
The court also decided an important case regarding the advisory
nature of the Guidelines. In United States v. Henry,121 in which the
panel vacated its prior opinion,122 the court upheld the defendant’s
sentence even though the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Alabama had failed to give him credit for time served for an
undischarged term of state imprisonment under section 5G1.3(b)(1) of
the United States Sentencing Guidelines,123 finding section 5G1.3(b)(1)
was not mandatory in light of United States v. Booker.124 Dissenting,
Judge Pryor argued that section 5G1.3(b) is still mandatory because it
does not relate to calculating the range of imprisonment, but rather

114. Garcon, 997 F.3d at 1302–03.
115. Id. at 1305 n.2.
116. 998 F.3d 431 (9th Cir. 2021).
117. United States v. Garcon, No. 19–14650, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 1938 (11th Cir.
Jan. 21, 2022).
118. 4 F.4th 1265 (11th Cir. 2021).
119. Id. at 1272–73.
120. Id. at 1272.
121. 1 F.4th 1315 (11th Cir. 2021).
122. United States v. Henry, 968 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2020), vacated, 1 F.4th 1315.
123. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5G1.3(b)(1) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2016).
124. Henry, 1 F.4th at 1319–20 (citing United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)).
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tells courts “which kind of sentence to impose—a concurrent sentence or
a consecutive sentence.”125
V. POST-CONVICTION PROCEEDINGS
The Eleventh Circuit rendered several significant opinions in postconviction proceedings, most notably involving inmate petitions for
“compassionate release” under Title 18 § 3582(c)(1)(A) of the United
States Code.126 Under section 3582(c)(1)(A), a district court may release
an inmate or reduce their sentence if there are “extraordinary and
compelling reasons” warranting relief, and relief is otherwise consistent
with the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).127 The First Step Act of 2018
amended this statute to allow inmates to file their own motions directly
with the court, rather than leaving it exclusively within the discretion
of the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), after the inmate has exhausted their
administrative remedies or after thirty days have elapsed after the
warden’s receipt of the inmate’s request.128
Many inmates began filing such motions when the COVID-19
pandemic began. As the COVID-19 pandemic continued, inmates
continued filing motions for compassionate release. A critical issue that
emerged was whether, in light of the amendments to section
3582(c)(1)(A)(i), district courts have discretion to determine what
constitutes “extraordinary and compelling reasons.”129 Previously,
section 1B1.13 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines130 provided
four narrow categories of circumstances that constitute such reasons,
namely based on an inmate’s health or family circumstances, and this
policy was binding on district courts.131
In a break with every other circuit to consider the issue, the Eleventh
Circuit held in United States v. Bryant132 that section 1B1.13 remains a
binding policy statement limiting the circumstances that can constitute
“extraordinary and compelling reasons” warranting a sentence
reduction under section 3582(c)(1)(A).133 Dissenting, Judge Martin
noted that the plain language of section 1B1.13 states that “the policy

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 1332–33 (Pryor, J., dissenting).
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (2018).
Id.
Id.
Id.
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.13 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
Id.
996 F.3d 1243 (11th Cir. 2021).
Id. at 1251–52, 1265.
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statement applies only to motions brought by the Director of the
BOP[,]” and not for motions brought by inmates.134
The court decided several other opinions governing the applicability
of section 3582(c)(1)(A). For example, a district court does not err when
it denies a motion under section 3582(c)(1)(A) based on the section
3553(a) factors without determining whether a defendant had
presented “extraordinary and compelling reasons.”135 Similarly, a
district court is not required to analyze those factors if it first
determines there are no “extraordinary and compelling reasons.”136
In cases involving motions for sentence reductions based on the
crack-cocaine provisions of the First Step Act, the court vacated the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida’s
summary denial of the defendant’s motion in United States v.
Stevens,137 holding for the first time that, though the district court is
not required to consider the section 3553(a) sentencing factors in this
context, an order on such a motion was nevertheless invalid if it did not
“adequately explain its sentencing decision to allow for meaningful
appellate review.”138
In another matter of first impression, the court in Armstrong v.
United States139 held that a sentence reduction under Title 18 § 3582(c)
of the United States Code, does not lift the bar on successive habeas
petitions.140 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA) requires petitioners to seek authorization before they can
submit additional petitions under Title 28 § 2255 of the United States
Code,141 unless there has been a new intervening judgement between
the petitions.142 Because modifications under section 3582(c) are mere
“limited adjustment[s],” not de novo resentencing, however,
modifications do not lift the AEDPA bar.143
Finally, in United States v. Gonzalez,144 the court held as a matter of
first impression that a defendant sentenced upon revocation of
supervised release may still be eligible for a sentence reduction under

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 1269 (Martin, J., dissenting).
United States v. Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234, 1240 (11th Cir. 2021).
United States v. Giron, 15 F.4th 1343, 1345–46 (11th Cir. 2021).
997 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2021).
Id. at 1317.
986 F.3d 1345 (11th Cir. 2021).
Id. at 1347.
28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2008).
Armstrong, 986 F.3d at 1351.
Id.
9 F.4th 1327 (11th Cir. 2021).
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the First Step Act if the defendant’s underlying offense is a covered
offense within the meaning of the Act.145
VI. CONCLUSION
This concludes our tour of the Eleventh Circuit’s criminal docket in
2021. The court considered several important and noteworthy issues
last year, and many of those issues may not be resolved until later this
year, as the court will be rehearing several cases en banc, such as
United States v. Garcon. Other cases are on their way to the Supreme
Court of the United States, such as the Eleven Circuit’s circuit-splitting
decision in United States v. Nunez. While the future is unpredictable,
defense lawyers, prosecutors, and judges are always well-served
considering the cases that came before them.

145. Id. at 1331.

